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ON LETTING THE LAITY LITIGATE: THE PETITION
CLAUSE AND UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE RULES
Everywhere in France today a class of men predominates
whom some call lawyers; others, pleaders. So great was the
cunning of these men about 300 years ago that not only have
they now almost completely overthrown the authority of the
public council . . but they have forced even the princes of




One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of
after-dinner speeches to affirm that all the interests of man
that are comprised under the constitutional guarantees given
to "life, liberty and property" are in the professional keeping
of lawyers.
-Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners (1957)
Every American jurisdiction licenses the practice of law.' Qualifi-
cations for licensure-prescribed sometimes by statute, sometimes by
rule of court-typically include graduation from an accredited law
school, successful completion of a bar examination, good moral charac-
ter, and payment of bar association dues.' Unlicensed practice may be
punished as contempt,' and also constitutes a crime in many states.4
Licensure's proponents (mostly lawyers themselves) usually portray it
as a consumer protection measure, designed to guard the public against
' State provisions are collected in J. FIscHER & D. LACHMANN, UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE HANDBOOK 6-110 (1972). In some states, rules against unauthorized legal
practice are not commonly enforced. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1, 20 (1981). An attempt by a layperson to enter an appearance on
another's behalf might well provoke enforcement in these states, however. In the federal
courts, admission to practice is governed by the rules of the relevant court. See, e.g.,
U.S. SUP. CT. R. 5; FED. R. App. P. 46.
2 See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.931 (fees), 600.934 (qualifications
for admission to bar; good moral character), 600.937 (educational requirements) (West
1981).
, See, e.g., MICH CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.916 (West 1981).
4 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 41 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-27-14 (1956); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-1 (1979); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 2.48.180 (1961).
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fraud and inferior legal craftsmanship.5 Most enactments proscribing
unauthorized practice, however, make no general provision for the
waiver of such "protection" by even the most informed consumer. Cli-
ents who surrender their right to advice and representation by state-
approved counsel thus effectively relinquish their right to be advised or
represented at all.'
Governmental solicitude for legal consumers might pass without
objection if potential advocates varied only in technical proficiency. But
they vary in other important ways that are captured only very imper-
fectly by the concept of "competence." They vary in ideological tilt, in
educational and cultural background, in intellectual style, in social
class, and in their relationship to the professional legal community. The
identity of the advocate shapes the content of the advocacy, and the
choice of a representative is effectively a decision about the very essence
of one's claim or defense. To the extent, therefore, that licensure re-
stricts the litigant's choice among advocates, it implicates the litigant's
interest in defining and controlling the presentation of her case.
Some jurisdictions evince at least a limited recognition of this in-
terest by expressly permitting individuals to reject assistance from the
bar and represent themselves in court proceedings.7 The Supreme
Court has held that for criminal defendants, at least, the right to ap-
pear pro se is of constitutional proportions." The right to appear pro se,
however, expands the class from which litigants may select their cham-
pions by just one member-the person whom only the proverbial fool
would pick.
' See, e.g., Hicks & Katz, The Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Agencies, 41
YALE L.J. 69, 71-72 (1931).
8 Convicted criminals constitute an exception. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (overturning prison regulation barring assistance from fellow prisoners in pre-
paring habeas petitions).
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1976) ("parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel"); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.1430 (West 1981)
("Every person of full age and sound mind, may prosecute or defend civil actions in
any court by an attorney, or may, at his election, prosecute or defend civil actions in
person."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (Purdon 1981) ("(a) Civil Matters-In
all civil matters before any tribunal every litigant shall have a right to be heard, by
himself and his counsel, or by either of them. (b) Criminal Matters-In all criminal
prosecutions the accused has a right to be heard by himself and his counsel."); Wis.
SuP. CT. R. 11.02(1) ("Every person of full age and sound mind may appear by attor-
ney in every action or proceeding by or against the person in any court except felony
actions, or may prosecute or defend the action or proceeding in person.").
8 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Faretta, a defendant in a state
criminal trial, desired to represent himself rather than use the public defender; the
California courts refused his request. Id. at 807-10. In reversing, the Supreme Court
noted, "Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented
is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not
his defense." Id. at 821.
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This concession is insufficiently responsive to the litigant interests
at stake. The first amendment, after all, forbids state action that abro-
gates the right of citizens "peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." 9 The plain language of that
proscription seems to embrace the concerted efforts of a claimant and
her advocate to secure redress in the courts.
This Comment will appraise the constitutionality of existing re-
strictions on unauthorized practice from the standpoint of the client's
petition rights. 10 Special emphasis will be placed on legal services ren-
dered in the context of actual or potential civil litigation-the context
that most straightforwardly implicates petition rights. Although
prohibitions against the lay practice of nonlitigious law pose serious
constitutional and policy issues, these have been ably discussed al-
ready.'1 Even critics of unauthorized practice rules, however, have
shied away from urging the deregulation of in-court advocacy." If their
hesitation stems from a perception that courtroom advocacy may well
be the last area over which the organized bar would surrender con-
trol,"' then their reticence may make good sense as a matter of political
strategy. It makes less sense as a matter of constitutional doctrine. It is
in the courtroom, at the very site where litigants press their grievances
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Most state constitutions contain similar provisions. See
ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 6; Aniz. CONsT. art. II, § 5; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 4; CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 3; COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 24; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 14; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 16; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; GA. CONsT. art. I, § 1, 12; HAWAII
CONST. art. I, § 4; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 10; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5; KAN. CONST.
Bill of Rights, § 3; Ky. CONsT. Bill of Rights, § 1; LA. CONsT. art. I, § 9; ME.
CONST. art. I, § 15; MD. CONsT. Dec. of Rights, art. XIII; MASS. CONST. Dec. of
Rights, art. XIX; MICH. CONsT. art. I, § 3; MIss. CONST. art. III, § 11; Mo. CONST.
art. I, § 9; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 10; N.H. CoNsT. part I,
art. 32; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 5;
OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 3; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; OR. CoNST. art. I, § 26; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 21; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 4; TENN. CONST.
art. I, § 23; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 27; VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 20; VA. CoNsT. art. I, §
12; WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 4; W. VA. CONsT. art. III, § 16; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 4;
WYO. CONsT. art. I, § 21.
10 No argument based on any alleged constitutional right of the advocate to prac-
tice law will be advanced.
"I See, e.g., Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Re-
ally Make Good Neighbors-or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 159 (providing historical sketch of development of unauthorized practice rules);
Rhode, supra note 1 (constitutional analysis of unauthorized practice rules focusing
upon due process and first amendment doctrines). Although both of these authors advo-
cate the abolition of unauthorized practice rules, neither focuses on the petitionary in-
terests implicit in the context of litigation.
12 See, e.g., Christensen, supra note 11, at 214-15 ("perhaps only duly admitted
lawyers should have the privilege of appearing in court"); Rhode, supra note 1, at 75-
77 ("in-court representation presents the strongest argument for excluding lay
practitioners").
13 See Rhode, supra note 1, at 76.
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upon the state, that their freedom to press their grievances may most
deserve protection.
Part I develops the argument that the petition clause should be
read as part of a constitutional framework that seeks to legitimate gov-
ernmental decisions, including court decisions, by submitting them to a
full and open discursive process. The right of individuals to petition the
courts provides one device whereby legitimating discussion may be fa-
cilitated. Part II describes how unauthorized practice provisions impli-
cate the petition right anatomized in part I. Part III assesses whether
licensure may nevertheless be a necessary component of any attempt to
vindicate the state's valid interest in protecting the consuming public. It
first suggests that a less drastic means analysis be used to evaluate li-
censure; a certification system is then proposed as both more conducive
to legitimate regulatory objectives and less restrictive of client rights.
Insofar as licensure is a superfluously drastic technique for achieving
permissible regulatory ends, it disserves the legitimating animus behind
the first amendment's petition clause, and should be declared
unconstitutional.
I. GENERAL CONTOURS OF THE PETITION RIGHT
For the better part of our country's history, the petition clause
languished in juridical oblivion. Although its meaning was hotly de-
bated in other arenas,14 it received virtually no judicial elaboration.11
Only in the last few decades have the courts begun to define the scope
of the petition clause in any serious way. It has become clear, at least,
that the petition clause protects grievances addressed to any depart-
ment"' of any sovereign, whether state or federal,17 against governmen-
tal interference.1 In particular, the petition clause protects access to
" In 1840 the House of Representatives, responding to a tidal wave of petitions
demanding the abolition of slavery, adopted a standing rule whereby it would refuse
even to accept petitions touching on slavery. John Quincy Adams led a protracted battle
against this rule, arguing that it violated the petition clause. Eventually, Adams pre-
vailed, and the rule was rescinded. See J.Q. ADAMS, SPEECH OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS
UPON THE RIGHT TO PETITION (1969) (reprinting portions of the Congressional de-
bate); D. SMITH, THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES: CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATIONS 81-108 (1971).
15 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), was apparently the first Su-
preme Court case in which the right to petition received any substantial discussion. The
Court stated, "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on
the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and
to petition for a redress of grievances." Id. at 552.
16 See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
17 See United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-24 (1967).
16 Federal interference with the right to petition state governments comes within
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state and federal courts"' and administrative tribunals.2°
The substantive nature of the petition right nevertheless remains
highly obscure. The courts have neither offered a detailed specification
of the right's content nor situated it within a larger vision of the first
amendment.2" Instead, the courts have usually cited the petition clause
only alongside invocations of the first amendment's speech and assem-
bly clauses2-a pattern that impedes a clear understanding of the peti-
tion right itself. Some account of the right must be supplied, however, if
the access to the courts that it affords is to be capable of intelligent
realization.
A proposed account of the petition right is sketched below. Section
A suggests that the petition clause be read as part of an overall consti-
tutional scheme for the legitimation of governmental action. Section B
then examines the scope of the petition right, particularly in the context
of litigation.
this prohibition. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983)
(unanimous decision) (construing National Labor Relations Act in light of petition
clause). In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, the petition right was held to prohibit the
NLRB from halting
[t]he prosecution of a state-court lawsuit. . . unless the suit lacks a rea-
sonable basis in fact or law. . . . The Board's reasonable basis inquiry
must be structured in a manner that will preserve the state plaintiff's right
to have a state court jury or judge resolve genuine material factual or
state-law legal disputes pertaining to the lawsuit.
Id. at 2173.
11 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
20 Id. at 513.
"I The commentators have largely recapitulated this omission. See, for example,
T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963),
which devotes no systematic discussion to the petition right. Given Meiklejohn's em-
phasis on the first amendment's role in protecting political speech, his silence concern-
ing the petition right is even more surprising. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO SELF-GovaNmENT (1948). The index to the leading casebook on
constitutional law, G. GuNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(10th ed. 1980), contains no entry for the petition right. Nor does Gunther devote a
chapter, or a section of any chapter, to the petition clause.
A few writers have nonetheless rushed in where most have feared to tread. See D.
SMITH, supra note 14; Note, A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for
Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973). For an excellent treatment of the historical ante-
cedents to the petition clause, see Smellie, Petition, Right of, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1933).
12 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-30 (1963) (expression, associa-
tion, and petition); see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (rights to
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and petition, "though not identical, are
inseparable").
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A. The Petition Clause, the Constitution, and
the Problem of Legitimation
Classical political theorists envisioned the relationship between cit-
izens and government as a "social contract."23 Although theorists have
differed regarding the nature of the social compact, 24 contractual con-
ceptions of government posit its binding force in the acceptance of gov-
ernment by the governed - the sine qua non of legitimacy.2 5 The state
can exercise vast powers in the service of chosen ends; the citizenry, in
ceding this power to the state, retains the prerogative to make demands
concerning the means and ends of its exercise.2" In short, a government
23 See, e.g., T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Dutton ed. 1950) (1st ed. London 1651).
Hobbes argued the "Soveraigne Power" is acquired by "Naturall force" or when "men
agree amongst themselves, to submit to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on
confidence to be protected by him against all others." Id. at 144.
See also Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT 1, 56 (E. Barker ed. 1947) ("When any number of
men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby pres-
ently incorporated.").
Social contract theories have long been propounded. For a brief sketch of the de-
velopment of this genre of political theory, see Barker, Introduction to id. at vii. This
conception of government was influential in the framing of the Constitution. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Nothing is more certain than
the indispensable necessity of Government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever
and however it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural rights, in
order to vest it with requisite powers."); see also The Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[G]overnments are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.").
" Compare T. HOBBES, supra note 23, with Locke, supra note 23. Hobbes be-
lieved that the formation of the contract was necessitated by the "nasty, brutish, and
short" conditions of life, see T. HOBBES, supra note 23, at 104, and was maintained by
force, id. at 139. Locke, in contrast, envisioned the contract as arising from a "state of
nature" characterized by "'perfect freedom" and equality of all. See Locke, supra note
23, at 4. The commonwealth was formed to preserve property and provide a "common
established law and judicature to appeal to," with all of its members thus "in civil
society with another." Id. at 50.
2" See supra note 23. The words "legitimation" and "legitimacy" as used in this
Comment refer to whatever norms bind the state in its actions. Different observers have
propounded different substantive accounts of these norms. Compare 1 M. WEBER,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 212-301 (1978) with J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS
95-143 (1975). This Comment's argument, however, rests primarily on identifying cer-
tain minimal conditions of legitimacy and does not rely on any rich or controversial
conception thereof.
For an argument that the concept of legitimation is too blunt an analytic instru-
ment to be of much use to social scientists, see Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in
the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 379. The alleged demerits of the concept of
legitimacy as a tool in empirical social scientific work do not, of course, detract from its
value as a normative political ideal.
26 For a small sampling of pertinent modern political theory, see, e.g., B. ACKER-
MAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); J. HABERMAS, supra note




accedes to its sovereign status only insofar as it recognizes that its ac-
tions must be legitimated.2"
In practical terms, legitimacy becomes an issue when it is chal-
lenged; problems of legitimacy are raised and assessed discursively. A
government's claim to legitimacy is therefore premised upon its toler-
ance of both general and petitionary discussion.28
This imperative to tolerance operates in several dimensions. 29
First, the state should not condition its tolerance on the discussant's
adherence to or rejection of any specific perspective or worldview.3 0
Second, the state should avoid interference with the advocacy of any
particular opinion or position. 1 Third, the state should not silence ad-
vocates by limiting access to communicative media or forums.3 2 Fourth,
'7 See, e.g., B. AcKERMAN, supra note 26, at 4-7 ("[Wjhenever anybody questions
the legitimacy of another's power, the power holder must respond not by suppressing
the questioner but by giving a reason that explains why he is more entitled to the
resource than the questioner is." Id. at 4.).
S Some writers have contended that just results issue from constraints on discus-
sion. See B. ACKERMAN, supra note 26, at 3-30. The "constraint" that reason imposes
on discussion, however, is to be distinguished from the state's forcible suppression of
disfavored ideas.
" The listed dimensions focus on modes of governmental interference with legiti-
mating discussion. From the discussant's standpoint, a statement generally (1) expresses
an opinion (2) from some perspective (3) in some forum or medium (4) to some audi-
ence that (5) may include the state. These, of course, are simply aspects under which
discussion (or its abridgment) may be viewed-not empirically discrete parts of histori-
cally embedded discursive acts. Thus a ban on feminist picketing within a one-mile
radius of the White House might be seen as primarily implicating any one of the five
dimensions. But see infra note 59 and accompanying text.
30 Cf., e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (violation of
free speech for state to punish Ku Klux Klan member's abstract advocacy of violence).
Also of interest are National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S.
43 (1977) (per curiam) (staying, pending appeals, a state injunction that forbade Nazis
to march in the village, show swastikas, or distribute literature promoting hatred of
Jews or others because such restrictions of first amendment rights can be imposed only
using "strict procedural safeguards"; id. at 44); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
(college's decision not to recognize local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
violated members' first amendment rights to the extent the decision was based upon
disagreement with the group's philosophies; the college could refuse to recognize the
group only if it showed the group failed to comply with campus regulations); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (the "mere abstract teaching" of Communist theory
will not sustain a conviction under the Smith Act; rather, there must be clear proof that
the individual defendant intends to carry out his organization's violent goals). But Cf.
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (the Smith Act, which makes it a felony to
belong to any organization advocating the violent overthrow of the United States, is not
unconstitutional under either the fifth or the first amendments).
Si Cf., e.g., Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (over-
turning prior restraint on literature criticizing real estate broker's activities).
32 Cf., e.g., Hague v. 0IO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion) ("Wher-
ever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have. . . , time out of mind, been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.").
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the state should not interfere with the circulation of disfavored ideas by
regulating aspects of social intercourse closely tied to the process of dis-
cussion."3 Fifth, in case the discursive process generates valid criticisms
of the government, some insurance should be provided that the criti-
cisms will be accorded the government's attention.
All five aspects are interrelated. 4 Tolerance of petitionary activity
implies tolerance in the other four dimensions. Abstention from condi-
tioning tolerance upon the content of a speech requires that the state
refrain from content-motivated interference with advocacy. Such toler-
ance, in turn, means that the state may not deny access to forums or
proscribe discursive associational activity. To the extent that the first
four aspects of discussion are restricted, the potential to present griev-
ances to the state is truncated, and legitimation is compromised.
The first four aspects of governmental tolerance serve purposes be-
sides legitimation, primarily the protection of individual interests. 5 In
the fifth area, which embraces the petition right, the public functions of
discussion are paramount. The discursive regulation of governmental
activity is deemed valuable for reasons that go beyond the self-interest
of the individual petitioner. So far as legitimation is concerned, the re-
wards of tolerating the private marketplace of ideas are reaped when
citizens address their government. The fact or prospect of confronting
criticism leads government to govern better. 6
33 Cf., e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (unanimous deci-
sion) ("Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view ... is undeniably
enhanced by group association .... [S]tate action which may have the effect of cur-
tailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.").
" The Supreme Court's treatment of the first amendment in related cases suggests
the interdependence of these elements. See infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
" Governmental tolerance of the discursive process may, for example, serve to
promote individual autonomy and self-realization. See Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978). Baker, who devotes no discus-
sion to the petition clause, extols a "liberty model" of the first amendment that protects
speech "not as a means to a collective good" but rather as "an arena of individual
liberty." Id. at 966. It has often been contended, of course, that permitting individual
discursive liberty conduces to the collective good. See infra note 36.
8' Thinkers from many different fields and wildly diverse ideological perspectives
have agreed that artificial suppression of discussion taints the validity of knowledge.
For a small sampling, see P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1978); P. FREIRE,
PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (1970); J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN IN-
TERESTS (1971); T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLUIrONS (1962);
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1947) (London 1859); J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1961)
(London 1644); K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (1962); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975).
Those who read only what can be found in law libraries may prefer Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., joined
by Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The interrelation of these five dimensions of state tolerance can be
seen by examining the entire first amendment,3" which embraces each
of the five aspects:38




Assembly Social Aspects of Discourse
Petition Audition of Grievances
by Government
The first amendment's role in promoting tolerance of discursive activity
links the amendment to issues of legitimacy, a connection frequently
emphasized by the Supreme Court. 9
Traditional canons of judicial procedure also recognize that full
discussion is a prerequisite to the legitimate exercise of power. Our
judicial system relies on the parties to bring facts to light, to interpret
them, to suggest statutory constructions, to propose readings of case
law, to tender theories of constitutional right, and to adduce considera-
17 Numerous constitutional provisions facilitate the discursive regulation of gov-
ernmental action. Many of the constitutional provisions that are so directed, such as
those relating to the franchise, make sense only against the backdrop of the general
discursive freedom provided by the first amendment. Leaving the first amendment
aside, a partial listing would include: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall keep
a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same . . ... "); id. art.
I, § 6 ("for any Speech or Debate in either House, [members of Congress] shall not be
questioned in any other place"); id. art. I, § 7 (in case of veto, President's objections
and names of members voting for and against override to be entered in journal); id. art.
I, § 9 (habeas corpus); id. art. II, § 3 (President "shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union"); id. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...
."); id. art. VI ("no Religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any
Office or public Trust under the United States"); id. amend. IV (warrants must "par-
ticularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"); id.
amends. V & XIV (due process); id. amend. VI (criminal defendants have right to
public trial, to be informed of charges, to confront opposing witnesses, to compulsory
process, and to assistance of counsel); id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people."); id. amend. XIV (equal protection); id. amend. XV (voting rights may
not be abridged "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); id.
amend. XIX (voting rights may not be abridged "on account of sex"); id. amend.
XXIV (poll taxes prohibited in federal elections); id. amend. XXVI (for citizens over
eighteen, voting rights may not be abridged "on account of age").
38 The Supreme Court has not chosen to associate clauses of the first amendment
with aspects of tolerance for discussion in the manner indicated here. It has pursued all
five themes of discursive liberty within the first amendment's framework, however. See
supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
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tions of public policy. Judges, in response, do not merely announce
their decisions, but also seek to justify them by addressing whatever
pertinent arguments the parties have made.40
Inasmuch as both the Constitution and courtroom usage reflect a
preference for influencing the sovereign's behavior through a process of
rational discussion, the hypothesis that the petition clause plays a legiti-
mating role represents a promising framework within which to expli-
cate the right of access to the courts protected by the petition clause.
B. Exercise of the Petition Right and the Role of the Courts
A petition will typically invoke legal or political norms quite dis-
tinct from the norm that requires the state to tolerate discussion.41
Sound government will not be furthered by requiring the state to grant
redress to petitions that invoke these norms invalidly or that call upon
the state to act in an illegitimate manner. The ship of state cannot plot
a new course every time someone performs the physical act of deliver-
ing a petition. Even where the government entertains, but fails to re-
dress, a valid grievance, it is the underlying interest the grievant as-
serts, and not the right to be heard concerning that interest, that the
government violates. The first amendment by itself, in this sense, be-
stows on the petitioner no right to prevail.42
These observations suggest a more general feature of the petition
right: just as the right to petition bestows no right to prevail, so too the
absence of a right to prevail does not obviate the right to petition.43 The
40 Where our judicial system does terminate debate, it is usually due to a percep-
tion that the questions in controversy have already been subjected to a relatively full
discussion. When this condition is not met, constraints on further debate are often
lifted. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (1982) (collateral es-
toppel inapplicable if party against whom it is asserted lacked full opportunity to liti-
gate issue in earlier proceeding). Limitations on discussion are also employed, at times,
to protect the discursive process from abuse. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ("redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" may be stricken from pleadings).
41 A litigant, of course, may petition the courts claiming a prior violation of her
petition rights. This, however, is an exceptional case and involves two distinct petition-
ary episodes: one in which the right was purportedly abridged and a second in which
the litigant asserts that her petition rights were violated by the first abridgment.
"I During the ratification debates on the first amendment in the House of Repre-
sentatives, it was proposed to include a right to instruct the legislature. The proposal
failed. See 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 759-68 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
4' The Supreme Court has indicated that baseless litigation may be prohibited
consistently with the petition clause but has required that the plaintiff's case be not
merely baseless but a sham. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight,
Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). A plaintiff would presumably be shamming if she
brought a claim not for the purpose of pressing a grievance but solely in order to
employ the apparatus associated with litigation, see infra note 56 and accompanying
text, to harass someone. The baselessness of her claim might be evidence of such a
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petition clause would otherwise require only that the state "tolerate"
the set of grievances it ultimately chose to favor with redress-a de-
mand whose satisfaction is close to automatic.
If the right to petition is to be meaningful, it must mandate some
minimum level of state receptivity to citizens' grievances. Any honest
effort to preserve the petition right must reckon with the fact that the
government can effectively avoid taking cognizance of grievances-by ei-
ther of two methods: it can directly impede petitionary behavior or it
can hide from would-be petitioners. Of these two methods, the latter
may be the more insidious. To jail dissidents is forthrightly to abjure
any claim to legitimacy, whereas to leave the phone off the hook simply
conveys the impression of a hardworking government already
overburdened with the cares of statecraft.
If petitioning the government is to be possible at all, the state
must, at a minimum, accept delivery of petitions4' -a duty that proba-
bly implies recognizing or maintaining forums that have been associ-
ated with governmental redress of grievances for time out of mind, just
as access to traditional "public forums" enjoys protection in the free
speech context.45 Perhaps, alternatively, the state should be free to cre-
ate whatever institutions it pleases for accepting petitions, so long as it
grants access to these institutions in a nondiscriminatory manner.4 In
either case, the institutions must not obstruct delivery of petitions based
on the unsuitability of their content if they are to meet their responsi-
bilities as petitionary forums.
It might nonetheless be proposed that petitionary responsibilities
need not be met when a petition is addressed to a governmental depart-
ment that lacks the power to resolve the underlying grievance. Any at-
tempt to delimit the petition right according to the power of the peti-
purpose. Likewise, the tort of abuse of process can presumably coexist with the petition
clause.
44 The rules of the House of Representatives provide that all petitions from citi-
zens presented by members to the clerk are entered in the House Journal and pub-
lished in the Congressional Record. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
86TH CONG., 2D SEss. 478-81 (1961).
45 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04, 306-07 (1940) (first
amendment permits regulation, but not foreclosure, of use of public forums; regulation
may not pertain to content of the speech); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)
(plurality opinion) (use of public forums may be regulated, but "must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied"). For a discussion of free speech problems in the
public forum context, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum, 1965 SuP. CT.
REv. 1, 10-32.
46 Cf Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a
Chicago ordinance regulating picketing "by classifications formulated in terms of the
subject of the picketing" because government may not select users of forum on basis of
content of speech).
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tioned department, however, soon encounters insuperable difficulties.4
For any given grievance, almost no governmental authority is wholly
without power to act on it in some manner. The legislatures, for exam-
ple, are empowered to enact statutes and to initiate amendments to the
Constitution;48 there may well be no grievance that they lack the power
at least to participate in redressing. The same is true of the executive
branches,49 which have the duty to see to the law's faithful execution50
and to recommend to the legislatures such measures as are deemed nec-
essary and expedient.51 The courts, of course, play an expansive role in
the substantive development of the law, as well as in defining the scope
of their own authority.52 It is thus difficult to identify any domain of
human conduct in which any of these governmental departments would
be utterly powerless to intervene.
To be sure, the state has only finite quantities of time and money
to spend on auditioning grievances or on facilitating access to itself, and
no amount of governmental generosity with its time or money can guar-
antee that officeholders will actually listen to grievances attentively or
thoughtfully.5" A distinction can be drawn, however, between the state's
acceptance and pursuit of petitions. Acceptance of a complaint does not
entail an inquiry into its validity, while pursuit of a complaint does
entail such an inquiry. Concededly, one feels reassured about the legiti-
macy of a government that accepts grievances partly from one's sense
that the public fact of a petition's delivery will sometimes pressure the
state into pursuing the grievance. A little nagging, that is, may goad the
state into acting responsibly. Responsibility, however, does not consist
47 In cases where the authority of the petitioned branch can fairly be de-
bated-that is, in all the interesting cases-the proposed restriction generates intolera-
ble consequences. The restriction implies, for example, that suitors in federal court
would not be protected if they were ultimately found to lack standing under article III,
or to have raised a political question.
48 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V; PA. CONST. art. II.
49 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II; COLO. CONST. art. IV, §§ 2, 8.
5o See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8.
5" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
52 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
53 Perhaps it is for reasons such as these that the courts have not interpreted the
petition clause to impose a state duty to supply an attorney to civil litigants or to mini-
mize access costs. In areas such as divorce, in which the courts have a monopoly on
remedial power, the Supreme Court has held on due process grounds that states may
not abridge indigent litigants' access to the courts based solely on their inability-to pay
a filing fee. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). But see Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (permitting $25 filing fee as condition for review of
denial of welfare benefits where alternative avenues for appeal are available); United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (permitting $50 filing fee in voluntary bankruptcy
proceeding). Although these cases were not decided on petition clause grounds, they do
not suggest strong sympathy on the Court's part for the problems of poor civil litigants.
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in letting all suitors for the state's favors talk until they tire or in devot-
ing equal time to every petition. Some grievances are more complex
than others. Moreover, the state should be free to devote extended con-
sideration to claims that seem especially deserving of such
consideration."
Assuming then that the state has no absolute duty originating in
the first amendment to allow any particular individual to be involved in
its discretionary deliberative processes, the question arises how far the
petition clause protects the rights of persons whose voluntary discursive
contribution the state chooses, or is bound by provisions other than the
first amendment, to solicit. This question assumes special importance as
regards litigation." Unlike pleas dispatched to legislators or executive
officials, a petition addressed to a court or quasi-judicial tribunal of
competent jurisdiction normally triggers an official process whereby le-
gal norms are enforced. 58 The parties forthwith become players in the
resolution of the case-in the pursuit, that is, of the plaintiff's griev-
ance. Although the courts may be affirmatively bound to accept the
plaintiff's complaint-along, perhaps, with the defendant's answer, pe-
titions to intervene, amicus briefs, and so forth-nothing in the petition
clause, standing alone, seems to guarantee that these documents will
precipitate, or play a role in, a trial.
57
The Supreme Court has nevertheless clearly indicated that the pe-
tition right embraces litigious activity."8 From the standpoint of pro-
moting legitimation, this makes good sense. Voluntary citizen participa-
tion in deliberative processes contributes to the perceived legitimacy of
the state's conduct, so that one properly desires some assurance that the
participants are in fact free to express their views. No sound reason
exists for permitting the state to present afalse appearance of receptiv-
It is possible that the state's selection of cases "deserving of consideration"
would be made in a manner unduly restrictive of petitionary freedom. Arguably, the
doctrines of standing and justiciability presently engender this effect. See, e.g., Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying standing to persons challenging HEW's gratuitous con-
veyance of property to a religious college); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (denying standing to persons unable to obtain medical services at
hospitals granted federal tax benefits; plaintiffs were challenging revenue rulings that
defined the hospitals as "charitable" institutions qualifying for such benefits).
5 See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
" The filing of a complaint alters the legal status quo insofar as, for example, the
plaintiff becomes entitled to judgment if the defendant files no answer. It also creates
powers in the parties-subpoena powers, for example-that are absent in other peti-
tionary contexts.
5 Other constitutional and statutory provisions may afford this guarantee, of
course.
" See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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ity to citizens' views. On the contrary, any governmental body that
reaps the political benefits from its apparent eagerness to entertain
open, participatory debate on its actions and policies should deliver the
reality of debate to an extent at least equal to that of the appearance.
In a judicial system that purports to let the parties present their cases
as they see fit, therefore, the parties' right actually so to present their
cases should receive the first amendment's protection.
Apart from the special character of the forum, petitionary speech
does not differ in its grosser aspects from ordinary speech. Conse-
quently, any technique available to the government for suppressing ex-
pression in the private marketplace of ideas may prove equally effective
in the petitionary domain. The state, for example, might deny access to
petitionary forums to the proponents of disfavored ideas, or might
abridge the grievant's right to associate for petitionary purposes, per-
haps by permitting grievants to enlist the aid only of persons whom the
state certified as right-minded.5" In practice, states have chosen to pro-
hibit unlicensed persons from acting as courtroom advocates. Part II
describes how the right to petition one's government is implicated by
these proscriptions.
II. How PROHIBITIONS AGAINST LAY ADVOCACY IMPEDE
LITIGANTS' PETITION RIGHTS
Discursive legitimation of judicial decisions might be compatible
with rules excluding the laity from the advocacy function in a world
where lawyers were licensed through a pure lottery with free tickets. In
such a world, the legal community might be a microcosm of society; at
the least, its members would be no less likely than nonmembers to un-
derstand and present faithfully their clients' claims. Unauthorized prac-
tice rules, however, help to make ours a world where candidates for the
" This coincidence of methods whereby private and petitionary expression can be
repressed may be responsible for the courts' habit of compound citation-their ten-
dency, that is, to see anti-petitionary measures as violating the petition clause and free-
dom of association or the petition clause and freedom of speech. See supra note 22 and
accompanying text. Neither the similarity of the techniques for abridging private and
petitionary speech nor a pattern of indecisive citation, however, should obscure the dis-
tinction between the general suppression of ideas and their repression in the specifically
petitionary context. When this distinction has made a difference in the outcome, the
Supreme Court has recognized it and has treated the general concomitants of petition-
ary endeavor as implicated by the petition clause itself. Consider, for example, the find-
ing by Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 512-13 (1939), that speech and
association incident to the assertion of federally created rights constitute aspects of peti-
tionary endeavor and hence fall within the protection of the fourteenth amendment's
privileges and immunities clause.
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bar are first selected from a small segment of the population" and then
subjected to at least three years of intensive acculturation to profes-
sional norms.6" By the time most students emerge from the legal educa-
tion system, their worldview is no longer representative of even the se-
lect pool from which they were chosen.6 2 The imperatives of
"competence" exact a price in breadth of outlook.
Professional legal norms, reflecting the biases of the education pro-
cess, are not neutral with respect to the spectrum of claims that clients
may wish to assert. Grievances not readily accessible to treatment via
existing doctrinal techniques are likely to be forced into more accepted
molds or abandoned altogether. Some clients may come to attorneys de-
siring such remolding of their claims. Others may desire to press issues
as yet- incompatible with legal norms, and may prefer to refrain from
recasting them in conventional doctrinal terms or from pressing other
points more likely to yield a favorable verdict in the particular case.
The bias of legal norms would be harmless enough if advancing a
client's claim were a purely technical matter, involving only the
mechanical application of formal rules of which lawyers, by dint of
training and experience, could claim a special mastery. The treatment
of some matters, such as name changes and uncontested divorces, may
sometimes approximate this caricature of the advocate's role.63 Even in
such cases, however, a client may view the matter as anything but rou-
60 See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
61 For a general discussion of the role of educational institutions in preserving
hierarchical structures in the division of labor, see S. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, SCHOOL-
ING IN CAPrrALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF
ECONOMIC LIFE (1976); R. SENNETT & J. COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS
53-118 (1973).
For a critical treatment of legal education as a mechanism of professional accultur-
ation, see ARISTOPHANES, CLOUDS. Modern criticism of legal education as a mecha-
nism for preservation of hierarchy and of acculturation to deleterious professional
norms is expressed in Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of the Hierar-
chy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 591 (1982).
62 See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REv. 563, 669
(1983) ("[T]he real message of the curriculum is ... that a mixture of low-level skills
and high-grade sophistic techniques ... is all there is-all there is and can be-to
legal analysis and, by implication, to the many methods by which professional expertise
influences the exercise of state power."). Unger's is a polar view, but it captures a real
aspect of the subject. Compare Veblen's remarks: "The lawyer is exclusively occupied
with the-details of predatory fraud, either in achieving or in checkmating chicanery,
and success in the profession is therefore accepted as marking a large endowment of
that barbarian astuteness which has always commanded men's respect and fear." T.
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 156 (1953).
63 The hardiest partisans of prohibitions against unauthorized practice, however,
are themselves the first to insist that such treatment disserves client interests. See, e.g.,
Letter from James W. Robinson to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (June 19, 1974),
reprinted in 39 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEWS 51 (1974).
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tine. For some clients, true vindication of their claims would require
the exercise of creativity and sympathy beyond the scope of technical
legal devices. 6 ' The problems of women seeking divorce, for example,
are often not so much expressed in the divorce proceedings as they are
refashioned to suit courtroom exigencies."
Whether a litigant desires to pursue an unusual or a routine mat-
ter, the restructuring or wholesale abandonment of her claim shields
the judicial system from confronting the litigant's conception of it. By
thus restricting a true petitionary process, the bar's monopoly on advo-
cacy works to undermine the legitimacy of legal doctrine in the eyes of
the citizens it regulates.66
Although the Supreme Court has never been presented with a liti-
gant who challenged attorney licensure on the grounds of a claimed
petition right," the Court's treatment of several related cases clearly
" In a recent survey, 21% of all respondents felt that "[l]awyers don't really try to
understand what their clients want"; 36% felt that "[l]awyers do not care whether their
clients fully understand what needs to be done and why"; 50% felt that "[l]awyers are
generally not very good at keeping their clients informed of progress on their cases";
and 44% felt that "[a] person should not call upon a lawyer until he has exhausted
every other possible way of solving his problem." B. CuRRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF
THE PUBLIC 228, 230 (1977).
8" [T]he most extreme precautions must be taken to avoid. . . an unfortu-
nate demonstration on your client's part. She must be made to understand
the serious, indeed, the catastrophic results which may follow an exhibi-
tion on her part. She should comport herself in a ladylike manner on the
witness stand if for no other reason than that it is her duty to do so: but
she must be made aware of the grave consequences if she fails to do it.
Therefore, you should impress upon her the critical necessity for main-
taining at all times a civil and orderly demeanor. This is not to say that
she is obliged to be calm. That may be too much to ask; in some circum-
stances, being calm may even be self-defeating. There is such a thing as
excessive composure. But she must be civil.
C. ROTHENBERG, MATRIMONIAL LITIGATION: STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES 11-13
(1972).
66 The Supreme Court has shown an awareness that the litigant's cbntribution
has a value not just for herself but for society at large:
The NAACP is not a conventional political party; but the litigation it
assists, while serving to vindicate the legal rights of members of the Amer-
ican Negro community, at the same time and perhaps more importantly,
makes possible the distinctive contribution of a minority group to the ideas
and beliefs of our society.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (emphasis added). The benefits accrued
from a multiplicity of voices are recognized in many ways. See supra note 36.
67 But see Silverman v. Browning, 414 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn.) (three-judge
panel) (rejecting equal protection and due process challenges to exclusion of appearance
by litigant's pro hac vice lawyer in state claim), affd mem., 429 U.S. 876 (1976);
Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.) (three-judge panel)
(finding no constitutional difficulty with prohibition of appearance by litigant's pro hac
vice lawyer in FELA action but citing no particular constitutional provision), affd
mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975). These decisions did not involve any explicit first amend-
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identifies the petitionary interests involved.
In Faretta v. California,8 the Burger Court recognized that crim-
inal defendants enjoy a right to conduct their defense without a law-
yer's aid. Although the Court devoted considerable attention to the his-
tory and language of the sixth amendment's guarantee of counsel, its
opinion also evinced a general concern for the rights of litigants to
manage their own cause:
It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer
manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate
to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial
strategy in many areas. This allocation can only be justified,
however, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept
counsel as his representative. An unwanted counsel "repre-
sents" the defendant only through a tenuous and unaccept-
able legal fiction.
6 9
Noting that some defendants might mount a better case than a lawyer
would, the Court added that to impose an unwanted lawyer on a de-
fendant "can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against
him." ' In any case, the Court observed, "[t]he defendant, and not his
lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction.
It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide
whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.""1
Faretta's emphasis on the sixth amendment raises the question
whether a constitutional right to appear pro se extends to civil liti-
gants.7 2 The Supreme Court has not had occasion to address this ques-
tion directly,73 but no sound basis appears on which to limit Faretta's
rationale to criminal cases. A civil litigant, no less than a criminal de-
ment claims. Moreover, the differences in outlook as between two lawyers may be too
slight clearly to implicate the content of the litigant's petition. The contrast between lay
and lawyer attitudes is starker.
68 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
69 Id. at 820-21.
70 Id. at 834.
71 Id.
72 At least one commentator has expressed doubts that any constitutional pro se
right exists in civil controversies. See Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representation and
the Power of Jury Nullification, 28 CASE W. Ras. L. REv. 269, 271 n.7 (1978).
7' No case presenting this question is soon likely to arise. Most jurisdictions now
grant the right to appear pro se either by constitution or by statute. See J. FISCHER &
D. LACHMANN, supra note 1, at 20-22. Faretta, moreover, arose through the defend-
ant's attempted rejection of state-appointed counsel-a resource seldom proffered to
civil litigants. If anything, the argument for freedom to conduct one's own case seems
stronger in civil actions, inasmuch as indigent civil litigants, unlike their criminal coun-
terparts, have no recognized constitutional right to an attorney provided by the state.
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fendant, "will bear the personal consequences" of a defeat, and to
thrust a lawyer upon a civil litigant seems equally likely to "lead him
to believe that the law contrives against him."
The recognition of a right to proceed pro se undermines the ratio-
nales usually given for unauthorized practice rules.7 4 Still graver ques-
tions for lawyer licensure are posed when the right to appear pro se is
considered together with a series of Supreme Court decisions upholding
the public's first amendment right to associate for the purpose of peti-
tioning the courts.
The leading case in this line is NAACP v. Button.75 At issue in
Button was a Virginia unauthorized practice statute making it illegal
for an attorney to accept employment or compensation from any organ-
ization unless that organization was a party to, or had a pecuniary
stake in, ongoing judicial proceedings.78 The same statute forbade any
organization to solicit business for any lawyer.77 The NAACP was en-
gaged in a program of financing and promoting civil rights litigation
that ran afoul of both provisions. It maintained a legal staff, which it
paid on a per diem basis to handle claims on behalf of nonmembers. It
also encouraged nonmembers to bring claims, by disseminating bulle-
tins and undertaking petition drives that prompted public meetings, to
"Unauthorized practice rules are purportedly justified by the need to protect
consumers of legal services. See infra notes 85-86 & 92-93 and accompanying text.
One may reasonably suppose that few persons who make the considered choice to
proceed without a lawyer would be careless enough to choose a lay advocate less intelli-
gent, industrious, or articulate than themselves. Rational civil litigants might sometimes
pick a less competent advocate if their opportunity costs in appearing pro se, less the
cost of the advocate, exceeded the value of their claim, discounted by the reduced
probability of a favorable decision. It is difficult to speculate on how often this situation
might arise. But, by use of marketplace analogies, it is easy to see that a litigant's
choice of less costly but potentially less competent counsel would be natural. See infra
note 108 and accompanying text.
In the normal marketplace of goods, consumers usually have a broad choice among
substitute goods at a range of prices. They can buy designer originals or off-the-rack
apparel, Rolls Royces or Chevy Chevettes, filet mignon or rump roast. The consumer,
the one who must pay for the good and endure its faults, makes whatever trade-offs are
necessary between price and quality. Evidently, many consumers find the best value
with goods that are of less than the highest quality. Similarly, a litigant's choice of a
less competent but less expensive legal representative simply constitutes a conscious and
efficient allocation of human resources, from which there is no reason to "protect" the
consumer. Indeed, the open marketplace itself should provide protection greater than
that now provided to consumers seeking cheaper legal representation since, if lay prac-
tice were not proscribed, one would expect lay practitioners to possess more experience
than nonpractitioners and hence to prevail more often than the ordinary pro se litigant.
For a discussion of the factors that shape an economically rational litigant's deci-
sion whether to litigate, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 21.4, 21.7-
21.8 (2d ed. 1977).
75 371 U.S. 415 (1963).




which the NAACP then invited its legal staff. The Supreme Court held
that the Virginia statute improperly impinged upon the expressive, as-
sociative, and petition rights of NAACP members.7
Any hope on the part of the organized bar that Button's holding
could be confined to nonprofit organizations of an avowedly political
character7 9 was soon dashed in a series of decisions upholding the right
of union members to associate for the purpose of securing legal assis-
tance.80 As a last line of defense, proponents of licensure have argued
that the NAACP's activities in Button did not include the practice of
law in the customary sense.8 ' This "distinction" begs the question, for
the issue is precisely whether there is any plausible account of the But-
ton Court's concern for the first amendment rights of litigants that does
not also implicate the choice of an advocate.
The specific conduct protected by Button was association by
nonlawyers with prospective litigants, undertaken in order to facilitate
litigation. The NAACP did not limit its activities to the financing or
the technical expediting of civil rights litigation; rather, it actively un-
dertook to educate segments of the lay population regarding the availa-
bility of legal claims.82 Widespread hostility to civil rights actions in
Virginia necessitated the NAACP's program of bringing clients to-
gether with advocates disposed to treat their claims sympathetically. As
the Court noted, "Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination, at least in
Virginia, are neither very profitable nor very popular. They are not an
object of general competition among Virginia lawyers; the problem is
rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to under-
take such litigation." 8 The Court thus recognized that unless litigants
had access to advocates who were friendly to their claims, the right to
petition the courts would be hollow.
The NAACP's role as intermediary in Button does not limit the
79 Id. at 428-30, 437.
7' See Christensen, supra note 11, eat 199; see also R. Hetlage, Address to the
Northeastern Regional Conference on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, May 3, 1974,
reprinted as Hetlage, U.S. Supreme Court Decisions During the Past Decade Affecting
the Field of Unauthorized Practice of Law, 39 UNAuTH. PRAC. NEWS 17 (1974);
Cedarquist, Lawyers at the Crossroads-Profession or Trade?, 31 UNAuTH. PRAC.
NEws 79 (1966).
80 Group legal service arrangements were upheld in United Transportation Union
v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). Like Button, these cases relied, to some extent, upon associa-
tional, as well as petitionary, interests; however, a litigant's choice among advocates is
dearly implicated throughout all of the cases.
81 See Hetlage, supra note 79, at 17, 20.
8 See Button, 371 U.S. at 419-22.
83 Id. at 443 (footnote omitted).
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applicability of the case to intermediary arrangements. The NAACP's
role instead dramatizes the associative interests that have always been
present in the traditional, unmediated relationship between advocate
and client. It would be anomalous if a client's right to receive informa-
tion about potential claims were stronger when such information came
from persons not serving as the client's ultimate representative than
when directly supplied by the representative herself. It would likewise
be anomalous if a client's right to associate with a representative favor-
ably disposed toward her claim depended on the right of the client and
representative to associate with some intermediary."
Thus, when only licensed practitioners are involved, the litigant's
right to control her case extends to the initial stage at which an attor-
ney is chosen. The question Button poses for defenders of licensure is
on what theory the scope of this right may be constricted to a choice
among advocates selected by the state.
One possible answer is that none of the client's interests are impli-
cated where the state designates a group of persons who are exclusively
entitled to enter appearances, as distinct from giving informal pretrial
advice. The existence of the pro se right precludes this answer. Another
possible answer is that permitting advice outside the formal judicial
process at a stage when legal action has not yet formally commenced
poses slighter dangers to clients' interests than would deregulated in-
court representation. This explanation of licensure's restriction of
choice among advocates is also unsatisfactory. The citizen's first amend-
ment right to petition for a redress of grievances cannot be confined to
those grievances that assume a form believed by the state to be in the
litigant's best interest, nor is the right to associate for petitionary pur-
poses contingent on a promise by the citizen to associate only in ways
the state considers wise. The very real dangers of fraud, abuse, and
incompetence in legal representation go not to the urgency of the liti-
gant's interest in free choice, but rather to the question of what mea-
sures a state may take to curb abuse without improperly abridging the
litigant's petition rights.
" Indeed, it was the very presence of such an intermediary to which the state
objected in Button.
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III. ATTORNEY LICENSURE VERSUS LESS DRASTIC
REGULATORY DEVICES
Any man we're ready to sting, in order our income to double.
Stingless drones are among us too, who without taking
trouble
Devour what others earn. 'Tis this that grieves us sore-
That men who evaded soldiering, who never wielded spear
or oar,
Should with hands unblistered and soft carry off our
revenue.
In future be this the rule: You carry no sting? No obols for
you.
-Aristophanes, Wasps
The four principal arguments advanced in favor of licensure are
first, that it preserves courtroom decorum; second, that it aids in the
discipline of attorneys who engage in unethical practices; third, that it
protects the legal industry from the ravages of destructive competition;
and fourth, that it protects consumers against incompetence.85 These
justifications reflect the dual character of legal services. On the one
hand, legal services play a pivotal role in preserving the rule of law in
our society; this perspective suggests that the delivery of such services
should be subject to standards different -from those applied to other
market commodities.8" The first two rationales for licensure seem to
stem from this desire to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
On the other hand, the delivery of legal services can be viewed as a
purely economic transaction; this perspective implies a predominant
concern for consumer satisfaction and welfare. The third and fourth
rationales for licensure appear to be designed to regulate the market for
legal services in a manner consistent with these concerns.
It is not immediately evident which of the four purposes provides
the primary impetus for existing unauthorized practice rules. One pos-
sible method of divining the purpose of the rules is to examine their
promulgating source. Market regulation is typically a legislative func-
tion, whereas the judiciary is a plausible source of rules protecting the
soundness of the adjudicative process. If, therefore, one wished to know
what purposes a state's unauthorized practice provisions sought to fur-
85 See, e.g., Hicks & Katz, supra note 5, at 70-72.
86 It does not follow that these standards should be more than usually stringent,
however; concern for petitionary autonomy may suggest that these standards should be
less stringent.
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ther, one might naturally look to the provenance of the state's rules. In
fact, however, this strategy affords little clarification.
Admission to state bars is often governed by judicial decisions or
rules of court.8 7 Even when legislatures do enact licensure measures,
state courts have commonly held, on separation of powers grounds, that
the regulation of legal practice is an intrinsically judicial function, and
that although the legislature may assist the judiciary in its performance,
the legislature cannot authorize practice where the judiciary has pro-
scribed it.88 The rationale typically supplied for this result is that attor-
neys are officers of the court, and the judiciary is therefore necessarily
empowered to prescribe minimum character and educational require-
ments for persons seeking to practice before it.89 This theory affords
little justification, however, for unauthorized practice rules reaching ad-
vice on claims that cannot, or need not, be litigated in state courts.
If, however, licensure is seen as ordinary economic legislation,
then no clear reason appears why unauthorized practice rules, or the
power to enact them, should follow jurisdictional lines in our federal
system. The question might arise, for example, whether state require-
ments making entry into the profession unduly burdensome may run
afoul of the dormant commerce clause ° or whether federal decisions to
permit nonlawyers to practice in certain specialized federal forums may
preempt state regulation of practice in those specialties.91
87 See J. FIscHEm & D. LACHMANN, supra note 1, at 3.
An exception is New York, which vests primary control in the legislature. See
In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). The general rule is illustrated by Opinion of the
Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 612, 194 N.E. 313, 316 (1935):
It is inherent in the judicial department of government under the
[Massachusetts] Constitution to control the practice of law, the admission
to the bar of persons found qualified to act as attorneys at law and the
removal from that position of those once admitted and found to be unfaith-
ful to their trust. While the judicial department cannot be circumscribed
or restricted in the performance of these duties, appropriate and essential
assistance in discharging them may be afforded by the enactment of
statutes.
" For an argument that the judiciary ought to confine itself to measures necessary
to preserve the dignity of the bar, leaving the protection of the public to the legislature,
see Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judicial
Power, 28 U. Ci. L. REv. 162 (1960). The traditional notion that judicial power over
the practice of law derives from the need to preserve decorum at the bar may operate to
deter the judiciary from developing more complex or innovative regulatory measures,
which might present too strong an impression of judicial meddling in social policy.
"' But see Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Beatty, 400 F. Supp. 234 (S.D. Ill.) (three-
judge panel), ajf'd mem., 423 U.S. 1009 (1975), in which a commerce clause claim
appears to have been rejected.
For example, 26 U.S.C. § 7452 (1976) provides: "No qualified person shall be
denied admission to practice before the Tax Court because of his failure to be a mem-
ber of any profession or calling." See also U.S. TAx CT. R. PRAc. & P. 200(a)(3)
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In short, unauthorized practice provisions look sometimes like
market regulations, at other times like rules of judicial procedure.
Despite their dual nature, inquiry into the purposes of unautho-
rized practice rules can nonetheless progress if one notes that, regard-
less of the promulgating authority, not all four proposed purposes for
such rules deserve to be taken equally seriously. The contention that
these rules are necessary to preserve order in the courtroom, for exam-
ple, presumably rests on the supposition that lawyers as a group com-
port themselves more decorously than laypersons-a queer hypothesis.
Lay breaches of courtroom etiquette, in any event, could readily be
dealt with by the same means used against noisesome lawyers: admoni-
tion by the court or citation for contempt. The same is true of ethical
breaches; measures used to restrain and discipline attorneys would be
equally effective against the laity.
The notion that the existence of the legal profession is so precari-
ous that the state must intervene in the market to save the profession
from perishing seems rather incredible. Even assuming some legitimate
need for support, however, other approaches, such as subsidization or
tax benefits, could achieve similar results for the profession without im-
posing licensure's restrictions on the client's choice of an advocate.
Only the fourth goal propounded for licensure systems, that of
promoting client welfare, merits serious consideration. 2 Defining client
(providing that nonlawyers may be admitted to practice on passing an examination). It
is settled that the supremacy clause bars the states from prohibiting practice in federal
forums by persons whom the federal government has expressly authorized to appear.
See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963). It is possible that an
overt federal attempt to regulate appearances before state tribunals would encounter an
obstacle in the tenth amendment. But see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). In prac-
tice, state-federal conflicts over admission to practice are infrequent. Perhaps owing to
considerations of comity, most federal courts closely track the rules of the states in their
jurisdiction. See, e.g., E.D. PA. R. Civ. P. 9(a):
Any attorney who has been admitted to and is authorized to practice in
the. . . Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and is presently in good standing
before such Court and who maintains an office in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania for the regular practice of law may. . . make application to
be admitted generally as an attorney of this Court.
9' Taking client welfare seriously as a goal does not mean taking it seriously as a
description of the impulse behind existing unauthorized practice rules. The driving
force behind these rules has never been any groundswell of consumer sentiment; it has
always been the bar. For an insightful analysis of the competing professional interests
involved, see Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1955).
Rhode's careful empirical work casts considerable doubt on the notion that con-
sumer welfare represents the actual raison d'etre of unauthorized practice provisions.
See Rhode, supra note 1, at 6-44. A useful historical overview of the bar's role in the
development of unauthorized practice doctrine appears in Christensen, supra note 11,
at 161-97. Auerbach suggests that the development of bar requirements, ostensibly fur-
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welfare, however, remains a problem. The profession's position has
been that client welfare is served when competent legal services are
rendered.9 This definition fails to consider the costs of these services to
the client and departs from one common American method for defining
consumer well-being: deference to the free market. Any decision to in-
tervene in the market on behalf of quality presupposes a market-inde-
pendent definition of quality,9 ' as well as a specification of the class of
services-legal, in this case-requiring regulation.
The current licensure system proceeds in rough-and-ready fashion
by defining the practice of law as the class of things that lawyers com-
monly do and by positing that competence at what lawyers do will be
fostered by attendance at the schools that produced the lawyers cur-
rently doing those things.95 An attempt to assess critically whether li-
censure actually protects client welfare, however, cannot begin by effec-
tively assuming that it does. Accordingly, this Comment will proceed on
the premise that the decisions a rational96 and informed consumer
would make constitute the best measure of that consumer's welfare.
This premise describes prevailing attitudes toward the market for the
services of licensed practitioners. Given this measure, any intervention
in the market for legal services can be justified only by reference to the
client's irrationality or ignorance or by the possibility of harm to the
interests of third parties.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently identified the rights
protected by the first amendment as fundamental to our form of gov-
ernment"7 and has subjected legislation affecting first amendment rights
thering client welfare, was motivated by a desire to exclude various ethnic groups from
the profession. See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
IN MODERN AMERICA 102-29 (1976).
9' For a critique of the bar's love affair with competence, see Garth, Rethinking
the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence and the
Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 639.
" On the elusiveness of such a definition, see Carlson, Measuring the Quality of
Legal Services: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 11 LAW & Soc'y REv. 287
(1976).
95 See Rhode, supra note 1, at 45-47. Even this assumption may sometimes be
questionable. In a New Haven study of uncontested divorces, pro se litigants did about
as well as lawyers in form preparation and court proceedings. In some areas, such as
timeliness in filing papers, the pro se litigants did better. See Project, The Unauthorized
Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 123-
29 (1976).
" The word "rational" is used here to denote a tailoring of means to ends. This
permits consideration of people who seek legal assistance for highly diverse reasons.
Purely for reasons of expository economy, much of the discussion to follow deals with
litigants whose primary interest is in maximizing net returns in the usual sense; how-
ever, the argument does not hinge upon this device.
' See supra note 39.
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to rigorous inquiry. "Substantial" furtherance of "compelling". state
objectives has frequently been demanded,9 and the unavailability of
"less drastic means"-of methods, that is, that would promote the legit-
imate purposes claimed for state legislation at a slighter cost to personal
liberties-has often been explicitly identified as a criterion of
constitutionality. 99
Although the less drastic means "test" has been criticized as
vague100 and although the Court has not explicitly pursued a less dras-
tic means "analysis" in every first amendment case, the test provides a
useful mechanism for analyzing the constitutionality of state regulations
governing legal practice. Rules that infringe personal liberty to an un-
necessarily draconian extent in light of their putatively legitimate pur-
poses constitute precisely the paradigmatic mode in which state acts vi-
olate the Constitution. Because innumerable legal rules affect the
ability of citizens to petition the courts, and because the petition rights
at stake are central to the very preservation of a democratic social or-
der, the question of less drastic means merits scrupulous attention.
Thus, even if licensure could be justified on the basis of promoting
client welfare, it is rendered unconstitutional if less restrictive alterna-
tives afford the same protection to clients. Section A of part III assesses
the market impact of licensure on consumer welfare. Section B then
compares the welfare of legal consumers under licensure and under a
proposed certification scheme. The section concludes that certification
protects consumer welfare as well as licensure and that licensure there-
fore represents an unconstitutionally drastic encroachment on litigants'
first amendment rights. 101
A. The Effects of Licensure on the Market for Legal Services
Licensure elevates prices insofar as it constricts supply. It con-
,8 E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963).
" See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08 (1964); Shelton v. Tuck-
er, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-49 (1941).
100 See, Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464
(1969).
101 It is important not to confuse the two steps of this argument. Licensure impli-
cates the petition clause by filtering the set of possible claims P1 through the conscious-
ness of lawyers before some proper subset P2 of the claims reaches the courts' ears,
possibly in distorted form. Licensure's defenders claim that it enhances client welfare.
One must therefore ask whether this aim can rationally be associated with the existing
structure of unauthorized practice provisions. It will transpire in the sequel that it
cannot-at least not on the definition of welfare adopted here. Licensure harms wel-
fare, by filtering the set of possible claimants C, through a cost sieve before some
proper subset C2 reaches the courtroom, possibly at too high a price. P, and C, are not
coextensive.
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stricts supply insofar as it conditions market entry on meritocratic re-
quirements. 0 2 Meeting these requirements entails a positive cost that
keeps some aspirants from competing, a cost borne in part by the cli-
ents of those who do compete.103
Licensure imposes a number of such meritocratic requirements af-
fecting the supply and cost of legal services. These requirements in-
clude passing bar examinations,"' meeting moral character require-
ments,105 and achieving educational standards. The entry of would-be
providers of legal services into the market is conditioned upon the ful-
fillment of licensure's requirements.
Educational requirements are probably the most formidable condi-
tion upon entry into the market for legal services. Most states require
lawyers to complete three years of training at an accredited law school,
and most such schools require a bachelor's degree as a condition for
matriculation. It is difficult to estimate the degree to which these re-
quirements function as absolute barriers; presumably, however, some
persons are excluded. The educational requirements can be met only by
persons in a position to gain admission to the appropriate institutions,
'' For a discussion of barriers to entry as they function in professional markets,
see Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93, 110-13 (1961).
103 Licensure also restricts the supply of legal services by creating human capital
costs. Consider the case of educational requirements. If it is assumed that candidates
defer $10,000 in annual after-tax income for seven years, see infra note 106, pay $4000
per year in tuition, and spend another $2000 on books and miscellaneous fees, then the
total cost of preparing one unit of human capital in the legal profession is about
$100,000. If this sum were invested in a 40-year annuity at seven percent interest, it
would yield an annual income of $7519, or about what a full-time employee would
receive at the minimum wage.
1"4 Studies have found a significant correlation between bar examination failure
rates and aggregate attorney income. See Holen, Effects of Professional Licensing Ar-
rangements on Interstate Labor Mobility and Resource Allocation, 73 J. POL. ECON.
492 (1965); Maurizi, Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL.
ECON. 399 (1974). More recent students of the problem, employing different methods,
have reached more ambiguous results. See Getz, Siegfried & Calvani, Competition at
the Bar: The Correlation Between the Bar Examination Pass Rate and the Profitability
of Practice, 67 VA. L. REv. 863 (1981).
105 Moral character requirements screen advocates by reason of their worldviews
and thus foreclose selection of advocates able or willing to present formulations of legal
claims that are generated by the excluded perspectives.
Potential implications of the use of such requirements are illustrated by their past
uses. Auerbach describes the disbarment of attorneys who publicly criticized World
War I and bar association attempts to exclude "unAmerican" candidates in order to
safekeep "the moral qualities that underlie our American institutions." J. AUERBACH,
supra note 92, at 103, 106-123. Attorneys have also been excluded on the basis of their
moral beliefs. See, e.g., In re Summers, 325 U.S. 516 (1944) (upholding Illinois's re-
fusal to admit candidate to the bar because of his inability to take oath that the state
interpreted as requiring willingness to serve in the militia, even though his refusal was
due to religious beliefs).
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pay the tuition, and defer a substantial part of seven years' income. 1
Such costs affect would-be consumers, as well as would-be providers, of
legal services. Lawyers who desire a return on their educational invest-
ments may pass on their costs to consumers through their fees."'
The price of legal services affects consumer welfare by determin-
ing a level at which the costs of litigation exceed the probable award.
Below this level, transactions are insufficiently valuable to litigate and
fall outside the courts' protection."' By raising fees to artificially high
levels, licensure expands the class of such transactions, as well as in-
creasing the litigation costs for transactions that are profitably pursued.
As the table on the next page illustrates, consumers in each of three
classes suffer a loss in welfare as a result. Parties currently appearing
pro se are deprived of the chance to purchase services at certain levels
of quality even if the increase in the size of the probable award that
such services would effect more than offsets their cost. Parties currently
proceeding with an attorney pay more than they would pay for the
same services in the absence of licensure and are prevented from opting
for lower levels of quality even if the decreased cost would more than
compensate for the smaller probable award. A third class of persons,
with claims of less than the threshold amount and for whom a pro se
appearance is for some reason not a rational option, are entirely fore-
closed from seeking the courts' protection, although in the absence of
licensure some might rationally choose to purchase services at certain
quality levels.
B. The Certification Alternative
The analysis in section A assumed that litigants possess sufficient
information about the services they purchase to make them the best
judges of their own best interests. Licensure, however, purports to re-
108 It is appropriate to reckon the cost of the educational requirements by refer-
ence to seven years of education, rather than three years (or 19), for two reasons. First,
the median level of educational attainment in the United States is 12.1 years-about
seven years less than the general minimum for lawyers. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICs: UNrrED STATES SUMMARY 1-361. Second, most states
provide for (only) 12 years of education that are essentially costless to recipients.
107 The effect on prices of human capital costs and entry barriers may not be
cumulative. Entry barriers by themselves may escalate fees to a level sufficient to cause
aspirants to pay the costs of education.
108 Such devices as class actions, where available, make this threshold lower than
it would otherwise be. Nonlegal norms may also protect parties to transactions below
the threshold. This threshold level, however, is still a primary consideration in any
rational decision whether to litigate.
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Expected Returns from Litigation
with and Without Licensure for Selected
Risk-Neutral Claimants with Meritorious Claims
Oppor-
Value of tunity Probability of Expected Net
Claimant Advocate Claim Cost Fee Prevailing Award Return Litigate?
A Lawyer 120 -- 80 .750 90 +10 Yes
B Lawyer 100 -- 80 .750 75 -5 No
C Pro se 100 40 - .470 47 +7 Yes
D Pro se 100 50 -- .470 47 -3 No
E Lawyer 120 -- 55 .750 90 +35 Yes
F Lawyer 100 -- 55 .750 75 +20 Yes
G Layperson 100 -- 45 .630 63 +18 Yes
The table above compares expected returns on litigation under licensure and in a hypothet-
ical, deregulated world. It is assumed for simplicity's sake that the clients are risk neutral and
possess meritorious claims of a definite value. It is also assumed that demand for practitioners'
services, and therefore practitioners' fees, will vary with practioners' success rates in a properly
functioning market.
Legal fees inevitably discourage litigation for certain claimants. See claimant B. Whether
these claimants proceed without counsel depends partly on the opportunity costs (deferred income,
for example) they would incur in doing so. Compare claimant C with claimant D. If licensure's
rescission lowered lawyers' fees by permitting competition from lay advocates, some claims cur-
rently excluded would make it to the courts. Compare claimants B and D with claimants F and G.
Moreover, claimants who already enjoy access would receive greater net returns. Compare claim-
ant A with claimant E, and claimant C with claimants F and G.
dress market failures caused by imperfections of consumer information
in the actual world. Licensure's approach to information problems is to
structure consumer choices so that even if consumers do not fully un-
derstand what they are buying, they can feel safe from the prospect of
being led through ignorance to purchase services of a quality so poor as
to compromise their interests. Although it may prevent a certain
amount of damage to client interests, licensure diminishes consumer
welfare as described in section A.
A certification system cQuld remedy information deficiencies with-
out incurring the same disadvantages. Under a certification plan, the
state-as well, perhaps, as private organizations such as malpractice
insurers-would issue documents attesting that the recipient had at-
tained a certain level of education, had passed an examination, or ex-
hibited other objective indicia of legal competence. Practitioners would
be prohibited from holding themselves out as possessing credentials they
lacked and might be required to display their certificates (or to an-
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nounce their lack thereof) to prospective clients. No practitioner, how-
ever, would be prohibited from advising or representing clients without
possessing a certificate. Clients would thus be free to select whatever
counselor they chose. 0 9
Some problems of consumer information will always exist in pro-
fessions like law and medicine in which clients are unable to ascertain
the nature and acuity of their problem without securing the diagnostic
advice of an expert. One function of the malpractice system is to protect
consumers from the untoward effects of misdiagnosis by deterring it
and to compensate them on a post-event basis when it does occur. Mal-
practice, however, does not reduce the incidence of professional misfea-
sance to zero, and some forms of professional incompetence may so se-
verely damage the consumer's interests that no post-event remedy could
make her whole. In a profession where these effects are of substantial
importance, licensure may be preferable to certification from the stand-
point of public welfare despite the additional restrictions it imposes on
consumer choice.
Medicine may be such a profession; the features of medical prac-
tice that may necessitate regulation by licensure, however, are not pre-
sent in the practice of law. First, medical misdiagnosis and mistreat-
ment may cause relatively minor problems to balloon into other
problems of kinds and proportions that the consumer cannot foresee.
This danger seems less significant in the legal context. Second, iatro-
genic illness can be crippling or fatal. But apart from criminal cases, in
which the Constitution affords a lawyer to most defendants who desire
one,110 legal problems usually do not cause fatal or irreparable harm. A
botched suit for money damages can be fully redressed after the fact by
a malpractice suit for money damages; the arrival of the money is only
delayed. Third, the level of medical treatment chosen by consumers act-
ing individually may have undesirable effects on the health of others.
For example, in a society where most persons receive immunization
against contagious disease, some may opt for a free ride by foregoing
immunization. If enough people chose this option, major epidemics
109 A growing literature extols the virtues and assesses the possible vices of certifi-
cation as a regulatory method. See Christensen, supra note 11, at 213-16; Gellhorn,
The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. Cmr. L. REv. 6, 26 (1976); Moore, supra
note 102, at 104-06; Reich, Toward a New Consumer Protection, 128 U. PA. L. REv.
1, 35 (1979); Wolfson, Trebilcock & Tuohy, Regulating the Professions, A Theoretical
Framework, in OccupATioNAL LIcENsu.E AND REGULATION 180 (1980). For the
classic exposition of the view that certification is virtually always a superior regulatory
technique to licensing, see M. FRIEDMAN, CAPrALIsm AND FRE.sIoM 137-60 (1962).
110 See "Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (no incarceration without
representation).
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would break out. In contrast, legal problems are not contagious. On
balance, the malpractice system seems to provide adequate protection
against legal incompetence.""1
Licensure, moreover, may create as many information problems in
the legal services market as it solves. One of the variables that most
effectively predicts whether persons with acute legal problems will seek
legal advice is the extent of their past contact with members of the
profession. Persons who have consulted attorneys before, or who have
friends or relatives who are lawyers, are more likely to seek assistance
than persons with little direct exposure to the profession. 1 2 Yet licen-
sure tends to restrict the number of both professional and private expo-
sures. There is currently about one lawyer for every 500 American
adults;1 if the number of practitioners were increased and their fees
reduced, consumer contact and awareness might thereby be enhanced.
This would be especially likely if competitive pressures led practitioners
at different levels of expertise to broker information about their com-
parative success rates.1 4
In any event, certification would provide consumers with no less
information than licensure. Any information conveyed to clients by vir-
tue of a lawyer's possession of a license would still be conveyed if the
license were transformed into a certificate that bestowed no exclusive
right to practice. Certification thus represents a less restrictive alterna-
tive to licensure, rendering the latter an unconstitutional infringement
of litigants' petition rights.
" Problems associated with picking a standard of care for nonlawyer practition-
ers might be resolved by treating malpractice as a contractual breach, with a contrac-
tual damage measure. See Garth, supra note 93, at 676-78.
112 See Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to
Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 145 (1980).
"I3 This ratio has remained fairly constant throughout the century. See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORIcAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMEs TO 1970, at 15, 840 (1975).
114 The first amendment forbids at least some restrictions on advertising by law-
yers. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Regulations on advertising by lawyers implicate clients' ability to choose among
advocates. This, in turn, touches upon the ability to present claims as the client envi-
sions them. This is illustrated in Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F.
Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981). The plaintiff in Bishop was an attorney desiring to
advertise his views on a variety of topics pertaining to delivery of legal services. He also
wished to advertise the fact that his associate was black. The court rejected his argu-
ments regarding expression of his views on legal services because they were not "state-
ments of verifiable fact." In response to the advertising of his associate's race, the court
approved the factual nature of the information and noted, "many persons, . . . are
apprehensive about going to a lawyer and prefer. . . to seek out a lawyer with whom
they can identify. (This court has encountered black litigants in need of court appointed
counsel who felt that they could effectively communicate with and trust only a black




Licensure implicates the petition clause by filtering the set of all
possible legal claims through the consciousness of lawyers before some
subset of those claims reaches the court's ears in modified form. Licen-
sure also filters the set of possible claimants through a cost sieve before
some subset of those claimants reaches the courtroom, possibly at too
high a price. These filtering processes constrain the sweep of the dis-
cursive process that is crucial to the legitimation of government.
The first amendment teaches that the right to petition inheres in
the citizen and does not await state authorization; it may be restricted
only to the extent necessary to further important state purposes. Here,
the purported state purpose of promoting client welfare is in fact hin-
dered, rather than enhanced, by licensure. Licensure restricts consumer
choice and thereby impedes access to the courts, both by requirements
imposed upon would-be advocates and costs imposed upon would-be
consumers.
Certification offers a less restrictive and more efficacious means of
promoting client welfare. No rational client would opt for a scheme in
which legal costs are superfluously high and the chance to invoke the
judicial system to protect one' interests is sometimes unnecessarily de-
nied. The existence of a less restrictive means to promote client welfare,
in a context implicating the petition right, renders licensure constitu-
tionally impermissible and serves to undermine the legitimacy of our
legal system by erecting a barrier between the judiciary and the citi-
zenry. The legislatures, therefore, should repeal it; the courts, overrule
it. Failing that, the legal profession should reflect on whether its mo-
nopoly on advocacy really conduces to the health of the Republic.
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